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The Condition of Premodernity 
Philip E Steinberg, Department of Geography, Durham University, South 
Road, Lower Mountjoy, Durham, UK DH1 3LE 
 
Abstract: In ‘Air’s Affinities’, Peter Adey adopts a premodern approach wherein 
an object’s elemental essence can be read directly from subjective encounter. 
This perspective effectively engages the material without endorsing 
determinism, the essential without endorsing the analytics of science, and the 
power of the encounter without endorsing the radical subjectivity of 
phenomenology. However, it strips observation and analysis of its potential for 
critique, instead endorsing an outlook that is, at root, theological in its 
dependence on faith for understanding unobservable and unexplainable 
processes, elements, essences, and affinities. 
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Early in 2014 I attended a public lecture where Peter Adey presented from his 
ongoing research on the concept of levitation. It was an entertaining and 
insightful talk, as Adey narrated the history of humanity’s fascination with the 
possibility that air might support the human body without mechanical 
intervention. Everything seemed to be going smoothly until a question was 
raised by a gentleman who, it appeared, was taking Adey’s enquiry of levitation 
enthusiasts a bit too seriously. As the question unfolded, the audience tittered 
nervously, gradually realising that whereas Adey was treating levitation as a 
historic curiosity the questioner was engaging it as a genuine possibility.  
 
Adey handled the question admirably, but he left unfilled an important analytical 
fissure that the questioner inadvertently opened up: If we are to truly account 
for the ‘magic, animacy and intimacy’ inherent in the elemental essence of air, 
then how can we reject as fantastic the possibility that air can have levitational 
properties? Or, stepping beyond the focus of Adey’s levitation lecture and 
broadening our attention to the subject matter of ‘Air’s Affinities’, one must ask: 
When one reduces (or, perhaps one should say, elevates) science to the magic of 
elemental essence, does one lose the ability to critique? 
 
Adey refers to his perspective as a turn to ‘older sorts of thought, politics and 
vocabulary.’ Actually, Adey overstates his case here a bit as he retains aspects of 
more conventional modern and postmodern perspectives. In his effort to identify 
fundamental essences, there are echoes of modern analytical thinking, although 
Adey clearly seeks a mode of understanding that goes beyond identification and 
explanation of causations and correlations. Likewise, in his attentiveness to the 
encounter by which our understanding of objects is produced there are nods to 
phenomenology. For Adey, however the essence of the object exists beyond, and, 
in a sense, before, the encounter – in its affect – and thus he seeks something 
more object-oriented than a subjective phenomenology. Finally, Adey draws on 
geographers inspired by assemblage theory to engage perspectives in which air’s 
essence exists in its state of becoming amidst the intersection of constitutive 
human and non-human elements. However, Adey is seeking an essence that 
exceeds both the encounter with the subject and the formation of the object in an 
assemblage with other objects. This quest leads Adey to adopt a philosophical 
outlook that is neither modern nor postmodern but premodern, an epistemology 
wherein encounters with objects are understood through reference to 
underlying, unobservable properties that, in turn, reflect underlying essence.  
 
In his effort to understand air as ‘more-than-chemical’, Adey hones in on how 
air’s essence is constitutive of the properties that are apprehended in, but that 
also exceed, the phenomenological encounter. Air, for Adey, is an element, and, 
because an element exists in its essence, that essence cannot be explained 
analytically or through its process of becoming. Rather an element just is. 
Therefore, understanding of the element’s essence (and the affinities associated 
with that essence) is reduced to descriptions of one’s encounter with the 
element, with the encounter understood as including imagined encounters, the 
subjective feelings inspired by encounters, and the meanings that are assigned to 
the object in the course of the encounter. As such, Adey is interested in air’s 
humours, its temperatures, its buoyancies, its odours: properties that are, at one 
and the same time, the subjective meanings that we assign to air and the 
objective properties of air.  
 
In effect, Adey proposes that we look through the phenomenon and go straight to 
the noumenon, or at least to the noumenon’s affective properties as we 
experience and encounter them. If we smell air, the air smells; if we are chilled 
by air, the air is cold; and if air gives us a feeling of lightness, the air has levitative 
properties. Kantian scepticism is no longer needed because, while elements exist 
‘anterior to human perception’, human perception (and, indeed, human 
imagination, including the literary imagination) opens a window toward 
understanding that lets us see past the object as thing and down to its ‘older, 
archaic, elemental and essential presence’: its affinity. 
 
I commend Adey for seeking to engage the material without endorsing 
determinism, the essential without endorsing the analytics of science, and the 
power of the encounter without endorsing the radical subjectivity of 
phenomenology. But Adey’s approach is also problematic because it suggests 
that the ontological essence of objects can be inferred directly from the 
subjective perception (or imagination) of them. From this metaphysical 
perspective, encounter with an object (or an element) can lead directly to 
understanding its fundamental properties (or its affinities). Affect takes you 
straight to essence. Indeed, for Adey, affect can take you beyond essence to the 
‘indefinite’ aspects of the elemental: the ‘gigantic’, the ‘magical’, the ‘more-than-
chemical’. 
 
Adey’s elemental perspective is a powerful tool for taking the curious scholar to 
places where science cannot go. However, it is dangerous for much the same 
reason. The problem here is one that plagues all theories of knowledge: How do 
we make connections between subjective observations (which, in a sense, are 
the most ‘real’ of all knowledges, because we feel them) and the underlying 
world? Other philosophical perspectives have managed this dilemma by 
restricting their scope of inquiry. To simplify a rich literature in the philosophy 
of knowledge, postmodernists temper their claims by disavowing the search for 
objective essence; phenomenologists restrict their analyses to interpreting the 
essence of the encounter; assemblage theorists hone in on moments of becoming 
(and unbecoming); and modernists, while holding that there are transcendent, 
objective essences, acknowledge that one’s ability to identify these essences is 
limited to cases where one can find verifiable, causal relationships. In premodern 
thought, however, there are no apparent limits to the connections that can be 
made between human observation and the identification of elemental essence. 
The certainty of the subjective individual observation is paired with the 
unassailability of the worldly object. 
 
Who could argue with that? 
 
But that, of course, is the problem. 
 
In the end, this link between individual, experience-based certainty and 
knowledge of the objective world rests on faith. Theological explanations 
typically combine the ‘reality’ of personal experience, emotion, and commitment 
with a systemic explanation of the worldly (and otherworldly) forces of nature 
whose workings transcend rational explanation and that exceed any narrative 
rooted in relations between constitutive components. I don’t know if Peter Adey 
would define his perspective as theological, or spiritual, or simply more-than-
rational. However he follows in a tradition, dating back many millennia, that uses 
individual experience and imagination to identify universal elemental essence. 
 
In his concluding section, Adey writes that he ‘anticipate[s] that an elemental 
geography of air might appear to be something of a step backwards to what 
could be perceived as an older, certainly dangerous and out-dated sense of the 
elemental’. His response to this anticipated criticism is that an elemental 
perspective is, in fact, less explanatory than one might think. Rather than 
explaining the essence of the world, a focus on elemental affinities ‘might mean 
drawing our attention to [a] particular set of materialities and imaginations, 
material-imaginations that still persist and can be taken seriously’. 
 
But in drawing our attention to these material-imaginations, Adey employs a 
system of logic that negates the possibility for critical assessment and potential 
refutation. And thus Adey inadvertently opens a door to those who would follow 
his lead beyond the cliffs of science and certainty, to the point where one is 
flailing one’s legs as one attempts to cross the abyss. And this would be a 
dangerous place to go…..unless of course you really can levitate. 
 
